{"id":1620,"date":"2022-01-12T06:04:00","date_gmt":"2022-01-12T11:04:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/actec.matrixdev.net\/?post_type=capital-letter&p=1620"},"modified":"2024-01-07T20:17:09","modified_gmt":"2024-01-08T01:17:09","slug":"top-ten-estate-planning-and-estate-taxdevelopments-of-2021","status":"publish","type":"capital-letter","link":"https:\/\/actec.matrixdev.net\/capital-letter\/top-ten-estate-planning-and-estate-taxdevelopments-of-2021\/","title":{"rendered":"Top Ten Estate Planning and Estate Tax Developments of 2021"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
This summary of 2021 \u201ctop ten\u201d developments includes discussions of the significance of the continuing Covid challenge, various legislative proposals even though they were not enacted, pending \u201canti-abuse\u201d changes to the \u201canti-clawback\u201d regulations, splitting gifts among transferors and among transferees, donor advised funds, \u201cJohn Doe summonses\u201d to law firms, a new user fee for estate tax closing letters, and the estate tax value of split-dollar life insurance reimbursement rights and of Michael Jackson\u2019s image and likeness.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Dear Readers Who Follow Washington Developments:<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n As in past years, I have prepared a list of what appear to me to be the \u201ctop ten\u201d estate planning and estate tax developments of the year. Also as in past years, these were not necessarily the only significant developments in 2021, and the selection is admittedly subjective. These comments are adapted from a Bessemer Trust Insight for Professional Partners<\/strong><\/a> dated January 3, 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Before June 1, 2015, the IRS routinely issued a closing letter (sometimes referred to as IRS Letter 627, not the same as a formal \u201cclosing agreement\u201d) when the examination of an estate tax return was closed, except returns that were not required for estate tax purposes but were filed solely to elect portability. The \u201cFrequently Asked Questions on Estate Taxes\u201d on the IRS website was updated on June 16, 2015, to state that for such returns filed on or after June 1, 2015, closing letters would be issued only upon request. Notice 2017-12, 2017-5 I.R.B. 742, confirmed that and also confirmed that an estate tax account transcript that includes the transaction code \u201c421\u201d and the explanation \u201cClosed examination of tax return\u201d can, as the Notice put it, \u201cserve as the functional equivalent of an estate tax closing letter.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many estate planning professionals were frustrated with efforts to obtain such transcripts and in any event have not found that a transcript has the same dignity as a closing letter for purposes of obtaining the approval of courts and the release of liens and otherwise documenting the propriety of making distributions, closing accounts, and taking other financial actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In regulations proposed on December 31, 2020, and finalized on September 27, 2021, the IRS established a $67 user fee for issuing an estate tax closing letter, effective October 28, 2021. Reg. \u00a7300.13, T.D. 9957, 86 Fed. Reg. 53539 (Sept. 28, 2021), 2021-41 I.R.B. 452.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The preamble to the proposed regulations acknowledged the importance of closing letters to executors, but added:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe practice of issuing estate tax closing letters to authorized persons is not mandated by any provision of the Code or other statutory requirement. Instead, the practice is fundamentally a customer service convenience offered to authorized persons in view of the unique nature of estate tax return filings and the bearing of an estate’s Federal estate tax obligations on the obligation to administer and close a probate estate under applicable State and local law.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is not persuasive at all. Surely the \u201cunique nature of estate tax return filings\u201d includes the IRS\u2019s benefit from liens, transferee liability, priority over other creditors, and other advantages, and with such power should come some level of responsibility. The preamble to the final regulations states that the IRS received comments opposing the establishment of a user fee, but it reaffirms the notion of the previous preamble that a user fee is appropriate because an estate tax closing letter is \u201cthe provision of a service that confers special benefits, beyond those accruing to the general public,\u201d without any acknowledgment of the fact that \u201cthe general public\u201d does not face those liens, liabilities, and other burdens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The preamble to the proposed regulations stated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn view of the resource constraints and purpose of issuing estate tax closing letters as a convenience to authorized persons, the IRS has identified the provision of estate tax closing letters as an appropriate service for which to establish a user fee to recover the costs that the government incurs in providing such letters. Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS propose establishing a user fee for estate tax closing letter requests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The preamble added that the practice of issuing closing letters for every filed estate tax return had been changed in 2015 primarily for two reasons \u2013 (1) the increase in the volume of filed returns since the enactment of portability and (2) the availability of the transcript alternative described in Notice 2017-12.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The preamble to the proposed regulations also included a detailed description of the calculation of the user fee, based on fiscal year 2017 and 2018 data, culminating in the determination of a full annual cost to the IRS (including direct labor and non-labor costs and a 74.08% overhead factor) of $1,160,058, divided by an estimated volume of 17,249 requests to produce the proposed user fee of $67 (rounded from $67.25). The calculations included an average of one-half hour of quality assurance review by a senior staff member applied to 5 percent of mailed closing letters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The regulations do not explain how to request a closing letter and pay the user fee, but the preamble to the proposed regulations stated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe Treasury Department and the IRS expect to implement a procedure that will improve convenience and reduce burden for authorized persons requesting estate tax closing letters by initiating a one-step, web-based procedure to accomplish the request of the estate tax closing letter as well as the payment of the user fee. As presently contemplated, a Federal payment website, such as http:\/\/www.pay.gov, will be used and multiple requests will not be necessary. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe implementing such a one-step procedure will reduce the current administrative burden on authorized persons in requesting estate tax closing letters and will limit the burden associated with the establishment of a user fee for providing such service.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n On October 6, 2021, the IRS posted Frequently Asked Questions<\/strong><\/a>, confirming the use of Pay.gov and addressing other procedural issues. On December 2, 2021, the IRS announced updates to its Internal Revenue Manual 4.25.2.5.10 to reflect the new estate tax closing letter and transcript request procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A closing letter does not preclude reopening an estate tax examination in some cases, as noted in Chief Counsel Advice 202142010 (issued April 1, 2021; released Oct. 22, 2021). That CCA also confirms that if there has not been an examination of the estate tax return at all, then an examination may be begun without complying with the \u201creopening\u201d protocols of Rev. Proc. 2005-32, 2005-1 C.B. 1206, under section 7605(b), and notwithstanding the issuance of a closing letter (Letter 627).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the questionable justification for the user fee, $67 is such a modest charge for an estate complex enough to need a closing letter that this development is likely to put the matter to rest. Especially if response times at the IRS improve in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Split-dollar life insurance arrangements have been in use a long time and were the subject of Treasury regulations in 2003. T.D. 9092 (Sept. 11, 2003); Reg. \u00a7\u00a71.61-22, 1.83-3(e), 1.83-6(a)(5), 1.301-1(q) & 1.7872-15. Simply put, a split-dollar arrangement is an arrangement by which the cost of life insurance is split between the insured and another party. In a common early use, the payor was the employer of the insured. Then split-dollar arrangements began to be used by individuals or within families for estate planning purposes. A recent variation, the subject of the 2021 Estate of Morrissette<\/em> opinion, involves the payment of premiums by a member of one generation for insurance on the life or lives of members of a younger generation \u2013 intergenerational split-dollar arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 1943, Arthur and Clara Morrissette had owned and operated, along with their three sons, a group of companies that became known as Interstate Van Lines, headquartered in Springfield, Virginia. There was tension among the three sons, and succession planning, in part to address that tension, had been underway since 1994. Arthur died in 1996.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In August 2006, a court appointed a company employee as the conservator of Clara\u2019s estate for a two-month term. Shortly thereafter, Clara\u2019s three sons became co-trustees of her revocable trust, and the conservator established three irrevocable multigenerational trusts, one for each of Clara\u2019s sons and their families. Those trusts, Clara\u2019s sons, and other trusts holding interests in the business executed a shareholders agreement providing, among other things, that upon the death of any of the sons the surviving sons and their respective trusts would seek to negotiate a price at which they would purchase the stock held by or for the benefit of the deceased son.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On October 4, 2006, each of the three sons\u2019 new irrevocable trusts purchased universal life insurance policies on the lives of the two other sons to fund the trusts\u2019 purchases under the shareholders agreement. On October 31, 2006, Clara\u2019s revocable trust (that is, her three sons as trustees) entered into two split-dollar agreements with each of the sons\u2019 trusts and contributed a combined $29.9 million to those trusts, which the trusts used to make the lump-sum premium payments on the life insurance policies. At that time the sons\u2019 life expectancies ranged from 14.6 to 18.6 years. Each split-dollar agreement provided that upon the death of the insured son, a portion of the death benefit equal to the greater of the total premiums paid or the cash surrender value of the policy immediately before his death would be payable to the revocable trust that had paid the premiums. Each split-dollar agreement also provided that it could be terminated during the insured son\u2019s life by the mutual agreement of the trustees of the premium-paying revocable trust and the trust that owned the policy. If one of the split-dollar agreements were terminated during the insured\u2019s life, the policy-owning trust could opt to retain the policy. In that case the policy-owning trust would be obligated to pay the premium-paying trust the greater of the total premiums the premium-paying trust had paid on the policy or the policy\u2019s current cash surrender value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As part of this series of transactions, the revocable trust agreement was amended to provide that upon Clara\u2019s death the split-dollar rights would be distributed to the three multigenerational trusts, respectively, that owed the reimbursement amounts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Clara died on September 25, 2009 (almost three years after the split-dollar transactions). Her gift tax returns for 2006 (the year of the transactions) through 2009 (the year of her death) reported annual gifts to the multigenerational trusts in accordance with the \u201ceconomic benefit\u201d regime for the taxation of split-dollar arrangements under the 2003 regulations, Reg. \u00a71.61-22(d). Under the regulations, those gifts were the annual cost of the life insurance protection under the applicable premium rate table issued by the IRS, less the amount of premiums paid by each respective multigenerational trust. Those gifts totaled $636,657 for those four years. Because the multigenerational trusts became the owners of the revocable trust\u2019s reimbursement rights upon Clara\u2019s death, the multigenerational trusts (as the Tax Court\u2019s 2021 opinion puts it) were \u201con both sides of the agreements,\u201d which \u201cterminated the split-dollar arrangements\u201d and \u201calso precluded any future gift tax \u2026 under the economic benefit regime,\u201d but \u201cdid not result in cancelation of the underlying life insurance policies.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Clara\u2019s sons, as her executors, reported on the estate tax return a total value of $7,479,000 for the split-dollar receivables, as determined by an appraiser. They later conceded that because of an error in the appraiser\u2019s original calculations the appraised value should be $10,449,000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of Clara\u2019s sons died in 2016. His trust distributed its Interstate nonvoting stock to a marital trust and its voting stock to three subtrusts for each of his three children, two of whom, along with one other of Clara\u2019s grandchildren, worked in the business at the time of the Tax Court trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Estate of Morrissette v. Commissioner<\/em>, 146 T.C. 171 (April 13, 2016), the Tax Court agreed that the economic benefit regime was appropriate, ratifying the Morrissettes\u2019 gift tax treatment, because the multigenerational trusts received no additional economic benefit beyond the current life insurance protection. But that still left open the determination of the amount includable in Clara\u2019s gross estate with respect to the reimbursement rights under the arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In another intergenerational split-dollar life insurance case, Estate of Cahill v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2018-84 (June 18, 2018), the decedent\u2019s son, as the decedent\u2019s attorney-in-fact and trustee of his revocable trust, had borrowed $10 million to pay premiums on almost $79.8 million of life insurance on the lives of the son and the son\u2019s wife. On the decedent\u2019s estate tax return, the son, as executor, valued his father\u2019s reimbursement rights under the split-dollar arrangements at $183,700. The IRS asserted that the reimbursement rights should be valued at $9,611,624, the aggregate cash surrender value of the policies as of the decedent\u2019s death. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) denied the executor\u2019s motion for summary judgment that sections 2036, 2038, and 2703 did not apply in valuing the estate\u2019s interest under the split-dollar agreement. Citing Strangi v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2003-145, aff\u2019d<\/em>, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005), and Estate of Powell v. Commissioner<\/em>, 148 T.C. 392 (2017) (reviewed by the Court), the opinion viewed the power of the decedent, through the revocable premium-paying trust, to terminate the split-dollar agreement and recover at least the cash surrender value as \u201cclearly rights \u2026 both to designate the persons who would possess or enjoy the transferred property under section 2036(a)(2) and to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the transfer under section 2038(a)(1).\u201d It did not matter that the premium-paying trust could exercise that power of termination only in conjunction with the policy-owning trust, because sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1) explicitly use the phrases \u201cin conjunction with any person\u201d and \u201cin conjunction with any other person.\u201d In a stipulated Decision of December 12, 2018, the court approved a settlement of the Estate of Cahill<\/em> case, in which the executor apparently accepted both the IRS\u2019s $9,611,624 value of the reimbursement rights and its assessment of a 20 percent accuracy-related penalty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Three days after Estate of Cahill<\/em> was decided, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke), citing Estate of Cahill<\/em>, denied the Morrissette executors\u2019 similar motion for summary judgment that section 2703 did not apply. Estate of Morrissette v. Commissioner<\/em>, Order, Docket No. 4415-14 (June 21, 2018). The court\u2019s order also noted that the IRS had raised sections 2036 and 2038 as alternative arguments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Estate of Morrissette<\/em> case was tried in Washington, D.C., in October 2019, briefed in the first quarter of 2020, and decided by Judge Goeke on May 13, 2021. Estate of Morrissette v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2021-60. The court held that the \u201cbona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money\u2019s worth\u201d exception in sections 2036(a) and 2038(a)(1) and the \u201cbona fide business arrangement \u2026 [that] is not a device to transfer such property to members of the decedent\u2019s family for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money\u2019s worth \u2026 [and that has] terms \u2026 comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms\u2019 length transaction\u201d exception in section 2703(b) were satisfied and therefore those sections did not apply. These were unequivocal taxpayer victories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding valuation, the court was more sympathetic with the IRS. Most significantly, it accepted the lower discount rates for calculating present value of 6.4 and 8.85 percent derived by the IRS\u2019s appraiser from yields in the life insurance industry and in the particular insurance companies, rather than the range of 15 to 18 percent used by the appraiser on whom the executors had relied in preparing the estate tax return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court also agreed with the IRS that the maturity date used in the present value calculations should be December 31, 2013, not the life expectancies of the insured sons as the executors\u2019 experts had used. The court noted:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhen the 2006 plan was implemented, the [revocable] trust agreement was amended to distribute the split-dollar rights to the respective dynasty trusts that owned the underlying policies. Such a distribution indicates an intent \u2026 to give the dynasty trusts complete control after Mrs. Morrissette\u2019s death.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Against that background, facts that the court found supported a December 31, 2013, maturity date included \u201cthe decision to purchase policies with high premiums and modest death benefits and July 2010 emails between [one of the executors and the advisors that had been involved in the planning] that discuss the possibility of canceling certain policies.\u201d As the court put it, those emails included one advisor\u2019s response \u201cthat he insisted that the policies not be canceled until the three-year period of limitations on the estate return had expired\u201d and that advisor\u2019s warning \u201cthat the IRS would likely see problems with the values of the split-dollar rights that the estate had planned to report on the return.\u201d The estate tax return had been filed on December 10, 2010, a couple weeks before the extended due date, which, applying the three-year statute of limitations, formed the basis for an assumed cancellation (maturity) date of December 31, 2013. The court even noted that \u201cthere are grounds for setting an earlier maturity date, but we will use respondent’s date.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n On December 13, 2021, the court entered a Decision, based on calculations implementing its opinion to which the parties had agreed, determining an estate tax deficiency of $12,575,459.24 and an accuracy-related penalty of $3,232,339.89, both subject to interest. That indicates estate tax values of the reimbursement rights significantly higher than those asserted by the executors. But the deficiency is significantly less than the approximately $39.4 million the opinion states the IRS had asserted in its notice of deficiency, and, to that extent, the case could also be viewed as a taxpayer victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Estate of Morrissette<\/em> confirms the importance of \u201cgood facts,\u201d particularly in contrast with Estate of Cahill<\/em> and, to the extent it is comparable, Estate of Powell<\/em>: (1) an operating business with clear succession planning needs; (2) less participation of the same family member on both sides of the transaction (as in Estate of Powell<\/em>); (3) self-financing of the insurance premiums, rather than borrowing as in Estate of Cahill<\/em> (which suggested a short-term outlook for the arrangement); and (4) much less aggressive discounting of the estate tax value of the reimbursement rights, reported at about 25 percent of the premiums paid (in contrast to about 2 percent in Estate of Cahill<\/em>). Nevertheless, the court could not get comfortable with even a value of 25 percent of the premiums paid, particularly with the presence of a revocation right, which at least one of Clara\u2019s sons had expressed interest in exercising. The court noted that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMrs. Morrissette had significant, nontax reasons for entering into the split-dollar agreements. However, the only purpose for the substantially discounted values of the split-dollar rights as compared to the $30 million that the [revocable trust] paid is estate tax saving. Knowing that any estate tax saving would be from the undervaluation of the split-dollar rights, the brothers engaged an appraiser that [their lawyer] recommended. [The lawyer] reviewed a draft of [the appraiser\u2019s] appraisal and asked [the appraiser] to make changes that reduced his opined values.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe appraisal was not reasonable, and petitioners did not rely on it in good faith. Accordingly, the estate is not entitled to rely on [the] appraisal as a reasonable cause defense. The estate did not act reasonably or in good faith in the valuation of the split-dollar rights. The estate is liable for the 40% penalty for the gross valuation misstatement of the split-dollar rights.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Clearly, a notable perceived benefit of intergenerational split-dollar arrangements is that, because the insureds are members of the next generation, their deaths are actuarially likely to occur significantly later than the grantor\u2019s death, and the reimbursement rights of the decedent\u2019s revocable (then irrevocable) trust are valued for estate tax purposes at a significant discount reflecting the time-value of money (even though the life expectancies of the insured sons in Estate of Morrissette<\/em> were only from 14.6 to 18.6 years at the time of the split-dollar arrangements, three years before their mother\u2019s death). Estate of Morrissette<\/em> confirms that this benefit exists but is subject to a test of moderation and reasonableness as well as a test of significant business or other non-tax purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A final significant takeaway is to observe the length of time it can take to resolve estate tax issues. Clara Morrissette died in 2009, and it took 12 years to determine a very substantial estate tax liability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On October 4, 2021, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus declining to hear a case involving the potentially troubling aggressiveness of the IRS in seeking identification of and information about a law firm\u2019s clients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A client (not identified in the court opinions) of Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC of Kerrville, Texas, settled an income tax dispute with the IRS by paying almost $4 million in tax, interest, and penalties regarding about $5 million of unreported income, over the years from 1996 through 2000, of foreign accounts in the Isle of Man and the British Virgin Islands that the firm had helped him structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With court approval (In re: Does<\/em>, 122 AFTR 2d 2018-6306 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2018)), the IRS issued a \u201cJohn Doe summons\u201d to the law firm seeking what the firm subsequently determined to be 32,000 documents \u201cfor \u2026 U.S. taxpayers, \u2018who, at any time [over 23 years, from 1995 through 2017] used the services of [the Firm] … to acquire, establish, maintain, operate, or control (1) any foreign financial account or other asset; (2) any foreign corporation, company, trust, foundation or other legal entity; or (3) any foreign or domestic financial account or other asset in the name of such foreign entity.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the firm\u2019s invocation of attorney-client privilege, the district court (Judge Rodriguez) granted the Government\u2019s motion to enforce the summons. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States<\/em>, 123 AFTR 2d 2019-1847 (W.D. Tex. May 15, 2019). The court concluded its opinion by stating (pp. 2019-1851-52):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cUltimately, because blanket assertions of privilege are disfavored, the Firm bears a heavy burden at this stage, and the Firm relies only on a narrowly defined exception to the general rule that identities are not privileged, the Firm does not carry its burden. As the Government suggests, \u2018upon this Court ordering enforcement of the summons, if Taylor Lohmeyer wishes to assert any claims of privilege as to any responsive documents, it may then do so, provided that any such claim of privilege is supported by a privilege log which details the foundation for each claim on a document-by-document basis.\u2019 [citation omitted] Whether certain documents fit the Liebman [United States v. Liebman<\/em>, 742 F.2d 807, 54 AFTR 2d 84-5938 (3d Cir. 1984)] argument the Firm advances is better decided individually or by discrete category.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The district court granted the firm a stay pending appeal. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States<\/em>, 124 AFTR 2d 2019-6271 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2019). While declining to say that the firm was likely to succeed on appeal, the court noted (p. 2019-6272) that for purposes of the stay<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cthis Court finds the balance of equities does indeed \u2018heavily favor\u2019 the Firm; on the one hand, the Firm would suffer potentially irreparable harm if the summons were enforced against it and that enforcement ultimately turned out to be wrongful upon appeal. On the other hand, the harm to the Government (and to the public) would be less consequential were the Government required to stay its enforcement of the summons and ultimately prevail on appeal. The Firm represented to this Court that it is compiling and preserving documents responsive to the summons [citation omitted], and if the Firm were to lose on appeal, enforcement of the summons would proceed just as it would if the Court had denied this stay.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the enforcement of the summons. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States<\/em>, 957 F.3d 505, 125 AFTR 2d 2020-1844 (5th Cir. April 24, 2020). The court\u2019s opinion, written by Judge Barksdale, stated (p. 2020-1849) that<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cdisclosure of the Does\u2019 identities would inform the IRS that the Does participated in at least one of the numerous transactions described in the John Doe summons issued to the Firm, but \u2018it is less than clear \u2026 as to what motive, or other confidential communication of [legal] advice, can be inferred from that information alone\u2019. [citation omitted] Consequently, the Firm’s clients’ identities are not \u2018connected inextricably with a privileged communication\u2019, and, therefore, the \u2018narrow exception\u2019 to the general rule that client identities are not protected by the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The full court voted 9-8 to deny the firm\u2019s petition for rehearing en banc. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States<\/em>, 957 F.3d 505, 125 AFTR 2d 2020-7208 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2020). Judge Elrod, joined by five others (including Chief Judge Owen), wrote a dissent, in which she argued (p. 2020-7209):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe IRS has traditionally served such summonses on financial institutions and commercial couriers. Not lawyers. There is good reason to be wary of investigations that exert pressure on lawyers. The relationship between a customer and a financial institution or commercial courier plays little, if any, role in our system’s ability to administer justice \u2013 but the same cannot be said of the lawyer-client relationship. When the IRS pursues John Doe summonses against law firms, serious tensions with the attorney-client privilege arise. Courts play a crucial role in moderating the executive power with respect to a John Doe summons. See United States v. Bisceglia<\/em>, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975) (\u2018Substantial protection is afforded by the provision that an Internal Revenue Service summons can be enforced only by the courts.\u2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHearing this case en banc would have helped clarify the boundaries of attorney-client privilege in this precarious area. I write to explain that the opinion can and should be read \u2013 consistently with our existing precedent \u2013 not to impose any new standard with respect to what is required for the attorney-client privilege to protect client identity.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Judge Elrod concluded her dissenting opinion (p. 2020-7210):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn the district court, the enforcement order is currently stayed and the case has been administratively closed to facilitate our review of the enforcement order. Once our mandate issues, it may be that the case is reopened and the stay lifted. If so, the May 15, 2019 enforcement order provides that the Lohmeyer law firm will have the opportunity to produce a privilege log, asserting privilege on particular responsive documents. If the law firm does so, the district court may choose then to conduct an in camera review of those documents. I am confident that any such review will be guided by the following [quoting the panel\u2019s opinion]: \u2018if the disclosure of the client’s identity will also reveal the confidential purpose for which he consulted an attorney, we protect both the confidential communication and the client\u2019s identity as privileged.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Addressing in a footnote the district court\u2019s assertion that \u201cblanket assertions of privilege are disfavored,\u201d Judge Elrod wrote:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe fact that the law firm made \u2018blanket\u2019 assertions of privilege was perhaps because the IRS demanded a very broad array of documents to be identified using a client list. When a summons is so structured, a blanket assertion of privilege may be appropriate.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The American College of Tax Counsel had filed an amicus brief (which Judge Elrod\u2019s dissent cited), including this warning:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe panel\u2019s decision could facilitate the issuance of John Doe summons to a law firm seeking documents identifying \u2026 any individuals who engaged the firm for legal advice regarding structuring a family limited partnership or annuity trust. Departing from longstanding and established precedent in this and other circuits, the panel\u2019s decision subjects the John Doe summons power to abuse by allowing the IRS to make broad requests to law firms to circumvent the privilege.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In line with that warning, many estate planners hoped that the Supreme Court would take up the case after the Fifth Circuit narrowly denied the petition for en banc<\/em> rehearing. But the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2021 (Docket No. 20-1596).<\/p>\n\n\n\n These opinions emphasize the need for estate planning lawyers to exercise care in taking on clients, advising those clients about estate planning actions with tax consequences, and perhaps in some cases following up the implementation of that advice. Indeed, the American Bar Association\u2019s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility\u2019s Formal Opinion 491, issued April 29, 2020, citing Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), describes a lawyer\u2019s duty to inquire when there is suspicion that a client is or may be using the lawyer\u2019s services to further a crime or fraud.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But there is no suggestion in the opinions that the courts believed that the law firm had encouraged, anticipated, or even knew about underreporting of income by its unidentified client the opinions call \u201cTaxpayer-1.\u201d On the contrary, the district court cited and did not question the firm\u2019s contention \u201cthat had Taxpayer-1 followed the advice given \u2018there would have been a lawful position that no income was reportable … [but] the taxpayer obviously did not follow the lawful advice \u2026.\u2019\u201d 123 AFTR 2d at 2019-1850. The opinion added:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFurther, the Firm argues that Lohmeyer \u2018has reviewed his remaining client files and has determined that they are distinguishable from Taxpayer-1\u2019 because unlike with Taxpayer-1, \u2018there is no evidence that any of the remaining taxpayers disregarded Taylor Lohmeyer’s advice regarding the proper structure and maintenance of foreign grantor trusts.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ironically, the firm\u2019s contention that the circumstances of \u201cTaxpayer-1\u201d were unique might seem to undermine its implicit argument that disclosure of the identities of other clients would in effect betray them as criminals. But the courts did not pursue that line of reasoning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201cKing of Pop,\u201d Michael Jackson, died on June 25, 2009. In Estate of Michael J. Jackson v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2021-48 (May 3, 2021), possibly the first reported case about the value for tax purposes of a celebrity\u2019s image and likeness, Judge Holmes states at the beginning of his 265-page opinion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFrom the time he was a child Michael Jackson was famous; and there were times in his life, testified his executor, when he was the most famous person in the world. There were certainly years when he was the most well-known popular-music star, and even after his death there have been years when he was the world’s highest-earning entertainer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBut there were also many years when he was more famous for his unusual behavior and not his unusual talent. And there were some years where his fame was turned infamous by serious accusations\u2026.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Jackson\u2019s executors and the IRS reached agreement on the value of all but three assets of his estate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The positions of the estate and the IRS and were summarized by the court as follows (with the court\u2019s findings added):<\/p>\n\n\n\nNUMBER TEN: ESTATE TAX CLOSING LETTER FOR A SIXTY-SEVEN DOLLAR USER FEE (REG. \u00a7300.13, CCA 202142010)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
History<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Regulations: Closing Letter for a User Fee<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Procedure<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Limitations of a Closing Letter<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Takeaway<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
NUMBER NINE: INTERGENERATIONAL SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE (ESTATE OF MORRISSETTE<\/em>)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Background of the Morrissette Family and Business<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Background of Tax Court Decisions<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Outcome in Estate of Morrissette<\/em><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Takeaways<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
NUMBER EIGHT: JOHN DOE SUMMONS TO A LAW FIRM (TAYLOR LOHMEYER<\/em>)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Background<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Summons<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Enforcement<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Affirmance<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Takeaways<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
NUMBER SEVEN: THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO POST-DEATH DEVELOPMENTS (ESTATE OF MICHAEL J. JACKSON<\/em>)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Dramatic Numbers<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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