{"id":1565,"date":"2008-08-01T14:26:00","date_gmt":"2008-08-01T18:26:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/actec.matrixdev.net\/?post_type=capital-letter&p=1565"},"modified":"2024-01-05T14:18:28","modified_gmt":"2024-01-05T19:18:28","slug":"alternate-valuation-and-private-trust-company-guidance","status":"publish","type":"capital-letter","link":"https:\/\/actec.matrixdev.net\/capital-letter\/alternate-valuation-and-private-trust-company-guidance\/","title":{"rendered":"Alternate Valuation and Private Trust Company Guidance"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
The Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Tailor Tax Rules to Their Historic Purposes.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Dear Readers Who Follow Washington Developments:<\/p>\n\n\n\n With the relief that the 2008 presidential campaign has now entered its final hundred days comes confirmation that there will probably be no significant progress on estate tax legislation this year. Congress has gone on vacation for five weeks, and Capital Letters intends to turn its attention away from Congress for a while and take a walk up Pennsylvania Avenue \u2013 about a mile to the Internal Revenue Service and another half mile beyond that to the Treasury Department. We find that the IRS and Treasury are accomplishing quite a lot these days. \u00a0 About this time each year, Treasury and the IRS publish a \u201cPriority Guidance Plan\u201d identifying projects to which they intend to apply resources for the period beginning July 1 and ending the following June 30. The\u00a0Plan for 2007-08<\/a>, published August 13, 2007 and reported in\u00a0Capital Letter No. 5<\/a>, lists the following 13 items under the heading of \u201cGifts, Estates and Trusts<\/a>.\u201d (The text is taken word-for-word from the published Plan. Comments in parentheses identify recent actions.) \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n This Capital Letter will look at the fifth and sixth items on the Priority Guidance Plan \u2013 proposed regulations under section 2032(a)<\/a> and guidance regarding private trust companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many of us learned in law school that in applying a rule to a difficult set of facts we can be helped by asking what is the \u201creason for the rule.\u201d If the reason for the rule \u2013 the advantage the rule was presumably designed to provide or the abuse the rule was presumably designed to prevent \u2013 applies to the new set of facts, then perhaps the rule should too. That is especially good advice after the rule has evolved incrementally, such as through several successive court cases or several successive IRS letter rulings. Precedent is important, but, rather than comparing the present fact pattern to the most recent cases, the law professor might suggest going back to the first cases, identifying the likely reason the rule emerged in the first place, and then analyzing the present facts in light of that reason. That law professor might wonder if today we sometimes have forgotten how to do that. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Alternate Valuation<\/strong><\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n In proposing changes to the alternate valuation regulations, the IRS provided a good illustration of applying the reason for the rule. In short, the proposed regulations draw on the obvious 1935 economic context and explicit 1935 legislative history to limit the use of alternate valuation to changes in market values of the sort (if not the magnitude) experienced during the Depression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The notice of proposed rulemaking almost fumbles the reason-for-the-rule analysis by appearing to present itself as an ad hoc reaction to the recent Tax Court decision in\u00a0Kohler v. Commissioner<\/em><\/a>, T.C. Memo 2006-152,\u00a0nonacq<\/em>., 2008-9 I.R.B. 481<\/a>, to resolve a supposed conflict between\u00a0Kohler<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0Flanders v. United States<\/em>, 347 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Calif. 1972).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Flanders<\/em>, after a decedent\u2019s death in 1968, but before the alternate valuation date, the trustee of the decedent\u2019s (formerly) revocable trust, which held a one-half interest in a California ranch, entered into a land conservation agreement pursuant to California law. The conservation agreement reduced the value of the ranch by 88%. Since that reduced value was the value of the ranch at the alternate valuation date (which until 1971 was one year after death), the executor elected alternate valuation and reported the ranch at that value. Citing the Depression-era legislative history to the effect that alternate valuation was intended to protect decedents\u2019 estates against \u201cmany of the hardships which were experienced after 1929 when market values decreased very materially between the period from the date of death and the date of distribution to the beneficiaries,\u201d the court held that \u201cthe value reducing result of the post mortem act of the surviving trustee\u201d may not be considered in applying alternate valuation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kohler<\/em>\u00a0(involving the estate of a shareholder of the well-known plumbing fixture manufacturer) considered the application of alternate valuation to stock received by the executor in a tax-free corporate reorganization that had been under consideration for about two years before the decedent\u2019s death but was not completed until about two months after the decedent\u2019s death. The court rejected the Service\u2019s attempt to base the estate tax on the value of the stock\u00a0surrendered<\/em>\u00a0in the reorganization (which had been subject to fewer restrictions on transferability), on the ground that\u00a0Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(c)(1)<\/a>\u00a0prevents that result by specifically refusing to treat stock surrendered in a tax-free reorganization as \u201cotherwise disposed of\u201d for purposes of\u00a0section 2032(a)(1)<\/a>. The court also noted that the exchange of stock must have been for equal value or the reorganization would not have been tax-free as the parties had stipulated (although, ironically, the executor\u2019s own appraiser had determined a value of the pre-reorganization shares of $50.115 million and a value of the post-reorganization shares of $47.010 million \u2013 a difference of about 6.2%). Thus, the court readily distinguished\u00a0Flanders<\/em>, where the post-death transaction had itself reduced the value by 88%. Significantly, the Tax Court viewed the 1935 legislative history as irrelevant, because\u00a0Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(c)(1)<\/a>\u00a0(promulgated in 1958) was clear and unambiguous and because \u201cthe legislative history describes the general purpose of the statute, not the specific meaning of \u2018otherwise disposed of\u2019 in the context of tax-free reorganizations.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the understandable eagerness of the notice of proposed rulemaking to identify the problem with the courts rather than with the 1958 regulations, it is clear that the drafters of the actual amendments of the regulations resisted the temptation to deal ad hoc with the treatment of corporate reorganizations in Kohler<\/em><\/a>, but instead returned to \u201cthe general purpose of the statute\u201d articulated in 1935, relied on in Flanders<\/em>, and bypassed in Kohler<\/em><\/a>. Significantly \u2013 and wisely \u2013 the proposed regulations make no change to Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(c)(1)<\/a> at all. Rather, they beef up Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(f)<\/a>, effective April 25, 2008, to clarify and emphasize, with both text and examples, the limitation of the benefits of alternate valuation to changes in value due to \u201cmarket conditions,\u201d thereby keeping faith with the concerns for deteriorating markets articulated in the Depression-era legislative history and reinforcing the historic role of alternate valuation as a means of ensuring fairness for executors rather than a standalone tool of affirmative estate planning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By taking the historic view rather than an ad hoc approach, the proposed regulations accomplish much more than merely answer\u00a0Kohler<\/em>. Indeed, the\u00a0Kohler<\/em>\u00a0issue itself does not even seem very important, because a value-for-value exchange is unlikely to make much difference in most cases and in\u00a0Kohler<\/em>\u00a0appears to have made only a 6.2% difference. Thus, while the proposed regulations have become known as the \u201canti-Kohler<\/em>\u00a0regulations,\u201d that label greatly understates their significance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The real impact of the proposed regulations is illustrated by their impact on the technique described in\u00a0Capital Letter No. 5<\/a>\u00a0as \u201cbootstrapping an estate into a valuation discount by distributing or otherwise disposing of a minority or other noncontrolling interest within the six-month period after death (valuing it as a minority interest under\u00a0section 2032(a)(1)<\/a>) and leaving another minority or noncontrolling interest to be valued six months after death (also valued as a minority interest under\u00a0section 2032(a)(2)<\/a>).\u201d\u00a0Examples 4 and 5<\/a>\u00a0of\u00a0Proposed Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(f)(3)(ii)<\/a>\u00a0specifically address that technique,\u00a0Example 4<\/a>\u00a0in the context of a limited liability company and\u00a0Example 5<\/a>\u00a0in the context of real estate, and clarify that changes in value due to \u201cmarket conditions\u201d do not include the valuation discounts that might appear to be created by partial distributions.\u00a0Example 3<\/a>\u00a0reaches the same result with respect to the post-death contribution of estate property to a limited partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These clarifications are neither surprising nor unreasonable. Many Fellows may have been reluctant to try such techniques that seemed \u201ctoo good to be true\u201d even though section 2032(a)(3)<\/a> and Reg. \u00a7 20.2032-1(f)<\/a> seemed technically to exclude only changes in value resulting from \u201cmere lapse of time.\u201d Those Fellows\u2019 reluctance will now be vindicated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Private Trust Companies<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Notice 2008-63<\/a> illustrates a similar historic perspective in a very different context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The increased use of family-owned trust companies as alternatives to either individual trustees or publicly-owned institutional fiduciaries has for many years been an important development in the stewardship of family wealth. The tax consequences of creating trusts with a private trust company as a trustee, or of replacing trustees of existing trusts with a private trust company, have been a topic of great interest, especially in the very common circumstance of independent trustees with broad discretion over distributions of income and principal that could create unwelcome tax consequences if imputed to the grantor or beneficiaries. That interest reached a crescendo when the IRS first issued private letter rulings on the subject in 1998 but has been pent up since 2004 when this project first appeared on the Priority Guidance Plan and the IRS has been unwilling to issue rulings while that guidance was pending.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There were several forms the anticipated guidance could have taken \u2013 the prescription of global rules in new regulations, the codification of existing private letter rulings through institutionalization of ruling standards, the publication of sample forms for governing documents, the provision of safe harbors in other ways, or something else, or a combination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The prescription of new rules has seemed to be preferable. The codification of letter rulings could impose limitations on the public on the arbitrary basis that similar limitations did not matter to the individuals who obtained rulings. Safe harbors are always troublesome because of the cloud they cast over other alternatives. The imposition of ruling standards would be most exasperating and would barely put the estate planning community back to where we were three years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notice 2008-63<\/a> solicits public comment on a proposed revenue ruling of about 28 double-spaced pages (about 8,500 words), affirming favorable tax conclusions with respect to the use of a private trust company. The selection of a revenue ruling format was surprising \u2013 and actually quite bold. A revenue ruling is essentially a form of a safe harbor. It would not have been this writer\u2019s first choice of format, because revenue rulings invariably are constraining as well as empowering. They tend to artificially force transactions into the mold of the fact pattern posed in the revenue ruling. Inevitably they include factual details that leave us all wondering and asking what they are there for \u2013 the details do not seem to be material, but, without identification of the rules of general application the revenue ruling supposedly illustrates, there is no way to tell what is material and what isn\u2019t. Because a revenue ruling is basically just an expression of an opinion, any taxpayer is free to challenge it, but, when the stakes are as high as they typically would be in a context justifying a family-owned trust company, hardly anyone would choose to incur the risk. Thus, a revenue ruling can have a chilling effect with little legal recourse. The proposed revenue ruling in Notice 2006-63<\/a> avoids or minimizes most of those liabilities. The three main ways it does this are by addressing all of the most common tax issues, by assuming facts that are for the most part very broad and flexible, and by asking for public comment before it is finalized (thus capturing one of the advantages of regulations in the revenue ruling context). Comments must be submitted by November 4, 2008.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The proposed revenue ruling systematically addresses five tax issues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n (1) inclusion of the value of trust assets in a grantor\u2019s gross estate by reason of a retained power or interest under section 2036<\/a> or 2038<\/a>;<\/p>\n\n\n\n (2) inclusion of the value of trust assets in a beneficiary\u2019s gross estate by reason of a general power of appointment under section 2041<\/a>;<\/p>\n\n\n\n (3) treatment of transfers to a trust as completed gifts;<\/p>\n\n\n\n (4) effect on a trust\u2019s status under the GST tax either as a pre-effective date trust or as a trust to which GST exemption has been allocated; and<\/p>\n\n\n\n (5) treatment of a grantor or beneficiary as the owner of a trust for income tax purposes.While these are not the only issues that the use of private trust companies can present, these are the most common issues. Thus, the proposed revenue ruling generally avoids creating a safe harbor for one purpose that is a trap for other purposes. Because of the format of addressing different issues in a single continuous series of narrative discussions, the revenue ruling format may actually make it easier to achieve this objective. Because the description of this project in the 2007-08 Priority Guidance Plan<\/a> referred specifically to \u201cestate, gift and generation-skipping transfer tax provisions\u201d (in contrast to the more generic first description of this project, in the 2004-05 Priority Guidance Plan<\/a>, as \u201cGuidance regarding family trust companies\u201d), it is especially encouraging to see the proposed revenue ruling address grantor trust treatment, because the guidance would be incomplete without it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With regard to fact patterns, the proposed revenue ruling helpfully posits not one but several trusts, illustrating both the creation of new trusts and the introduction of a private trust company as a trustee of an old trust. Each trust instrument posited in the proposed revenue ruling provides for complete discretionary authority over distributions of both income and principal, thus precluding speculation about any difference between the two. Likewise, each trust instrument provides each successive primary beneficiary with a reasonably broad testamentary power of appointment (although not as broad as everyone except the beneficiary\u2019s estate and creditors). And each trust instrument provides for the grantor\u2019s or primary beneficiary\u2019s unilateral appointment (but not removal) of trustees, with no restrictions other than on the ability to appoint oneself. Finally, the proposed revenue ruling defines discretionary distributions as any permissible distributions that are not mandated in the trust instrument or by applicable law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Additional flexibility is built into the proposed revenue ruling by the provision of two scenarios \u2013 one in which the private trust company is formed under a state statute with certain limitations and one in which the private trust company is formed in a state without such a statute but comparable limitations are included in the governing documents of the private trust company itself, thus removing one potential concern for unfair discrimination between otherwise similar private trust companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another encouraging feature of the proposed revenue ruling is a paragraph near the end that identifies three factual details that are not material to the favorable tax conclusions, explicitly confirming that the conclusions would not change if those details changed. This feature, not always found in revenue rulings, provides a measure of relief from the anxiety that the departure from factual details could jeopardize reliance on the revenue ruling. No doubt the public comments on the proposed revenue ruling will question the materiality of more factual details than these three. Some likely examples (but not an exhaustive list) are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the proposed revenue ruling can undoubtedly be improved, and Notice 2008-63<\/a> is likely to attract suggestions to that effect, it is an encouragingly good start. The most obvious reason is the basic premise of the proposed revenue ruling, as stated in the second paragraph of Notice 2008-63<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The IRS and the Treasury Department intend that the revenue ruling, once issued, will confirm certain tax consequences of the use of a private trust company that are not more restrictive than the consequences that could have been achieved by a taxpayer directly, but without permitting a taxpayer to achieve tax consequences through the use of a private trust company that could not have been achieved had the taxpayer acted directly. Comments are specifically requested as to whether or not the draft revenue ruling will achieve that intended result.To paraphrase, the only reason<\/em> why the IRS and Treasury should care about a private trust company is that it could provide a pretense of theoretical independence but in practice could be exploited by family member-owners to indirectly exercise control over a trust that would trigger time-honored tax rules, largely dating from the 1930s and 1940s, if such control were held by family members directly. Notice 2008-63<\/a> therefore looks to those time-honored rules and strives to come up with rules for a private trust company that are no more onerous. A more onerous rule could bar the private trust company from roles that an individual family member could fill directly. That would push the tax rules beyond what is needed to simply prevent family members from using a private trust company to do indirectly what they could not do directly, which is the reason<\/em> for having any such rules in the first place. In other words, Notice 2008-63<\/a> identifies the reason for the rule and uses that as the standard for crafting the rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, by adding that \u201c[c]omments are specifically requested as to whether or not the draft revenue ruling will achieve that intended result,\u201d the IRS and Treasury have not only adopted a reason-for-the-rule standard, but they have explicitly invited the public to hold them accountable to that standard in public comments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The law professor must be smiling. Ronald D. Aucutt \u00a9 2008 by Ronald D. Aucutt. 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